Darko Jerković, Novi list

D.J.: We are confronted with claims that the Israeli-American war against Iran has no clearly defined objectives?

S.V.: Those claims are not accurate. On the contrary — the logic is clearly established through the “America First” concept advocated by Donald Trump: escalation toward dominance.

This is a classic “escalation logic” — continuous pressure on Russia and China to test whether they will react and how willing they are to support each other. If they do not react, the United States confirms global dominance; if they do, the world enters a war that resets the international order. In other words, this is a conscious geopolitical “game of Russian roulette.”

Such a strategy exists in theory, but in a world of nuclear powers it carries extreme risk and unpredictable consequences. The key danger is drawing China or Russia into direct confrontation — the moment when “managed escalation” turns into uncontrolled global war.

Therefore, if we are not yet in World War III today, it is primarily because Moscow and Beijing are avoiding direct confrontation with the United States — despite pressures, sanctions, NATO expansion, the trade war with China, tensions over Taiwan, and the abduction of Maduro in Venezuela; despite withdrawal from agreements with Iran, military strikes and targeted eliminations (“decapitations”) of Iranian leadership and its proxy actors, as well as open threats to overthrow the Iranian regime.

In short: we are no longer speaking of the “possibility” of war, but of a “structure of World War III” that already exists — only the trigger is missing: a direct clash between major powers.

D.J.: What kind of incident or provocation could force Russia and China to “pull the trigger”?

S.V.: One scenario is becoming increasingly likely: a planned American attack on Cuba, which would transform the existing conflict from a regional one into a transcontinental — and potentially global — war.

Geographically speaking, Europe and Asia form a single Eurasian space, which is why the war in Iran is already described as a “major regional war.” However, the opening of a Caribbean front would dramatically change the picture: the same actors — the United States, Russia, and China — would find themselves indirectly (through proxies) engaged in conflict in Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Caribbean, thus across multiple continents and hemispheres.

It is important to note that in identifying the conditions for the outbreak of a world war, geography matters because it reflects operational reality: different military commands, logistical networks, alliances, and political blocs — all classical elements of a world war. An attack on Cuba (or, for example, escalation around Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific) would mean entering a “globalized war system on the verge of world war.”

In this sense, Trump recently called on NATO allies and partners from the Gulf states to join him in the Strait of Hormuz — with a direct message to China: if you use the passage, you must participate in its protection. This placed Beijing in a position of choice — to act within the American framework or risk being labeled a free rider benefiting from security provided by others.

As a result, since the beginning of this year, we have witnessed increasing pressure and attempts to discredit Russia and China as powers capable of protecting their allies — at a time when regional conflicts are rapidly being linked into a global confrontation.

D.J.: How could Europe be drawn into military operations in the Caribbean region?

S.V.: After a possible attack on Cuba, Trump could in the same way call on the European Union to join him in the Caribbean region, where French overseas territories (Guadeloupe and Martinique), which are part of the EU, are located, as well as the United Kingdom, which has sovereignty over several islands there (Cayman Islands, Virgin Islands, Anguilla, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos).

This would bring us back to the logic of the Cuban Missile Crisis — “who controls whose backyard” — but with reversed roles. The United States and Russia are already clashing in Ukraine, through political changes and civil and interstate war, over control of the “Russian backyard.” By attacking Cuba, Trump would challenge Putin to respond in America’s “backyard.”

If Putin fails to respond, it would be interpreted as weakness, potentially encouraging allied forces to launch an offensive on the Ukrainian front — a scenario advocated by NATO and EU leaders. United behind Zelensky, they have already aligned themselves with the Ukrainian leader, who offers assistance to the Trump–Netanyahu duo and Gulf monarchies in defending against Iranian drones of the type Russia is already using in Ukraine. This would officially open the transfer of the Ukrainian war to the Middle East and a “service exchange”: Trump would not withdraw support for Ukraine, while the E3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany), with Zelensky at the forefront, would become more actively involved in “managing the consequences” of Israeli-American aggression against Iran. Similar services could be offered by Europeans in the Caribbean Sea or, if necessary, in the Indo-Pacific, where other French overseas territories are located.

Since the official Western strategy of expansion toward Russia has not changed since the end of the Second World War, Europe could once again find itself in the familiar scenario of a global East–West conflict using conventional weapons. Especially since Russia is unable to conclude the war in Ukraine — thereby demonstrating that it is still guided by the old Russian “strategy of sacrifice”: a willingness to endure a long, exhausting war with heavy losses, which it ultimately expects to win.

It is becoming increasingly likely that this continuum can only be broken if one of the nuclear powers (USA, UK, Russia, China, France, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel) is the first to resort to nuclear weapons.

D.J.: Where are Europeans and international law in this “structure of World War III”?

S.V.: European states, with the exception of Spain, have not condemned the illegal US-Israeli war in Iran, nor have they offered a diplomatic initiative to stop the spiral of violence in the Middle East. Thus, European foreign policy has lost even hypocrisy — leaving only political irrelevance.

Why? The E3 — together with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen — failed to prevent the aggression through diplomacy between the United States and Iran. By activating UN snapback sanctions, they further increased tensions. They then avoided qualifying the war as illegal, as required under international law, and immediately shifted focus to managing its consequences — namely defending against Iranian retaliation, including attacks on coalition bases and interests in Gulf states.

This “loud” European silence regarding responsibility of Israel and the United States for morally and legally prosecutable actions — decapitations and armed aggression — sends a clear message: international law applies only as long as the hegemon does not decide otherwise. This is by no means an expression of European neutrality, but rather the erosion of the order the Union claims to defend. Pedro Sánchez is the only one who clearly called the war illegal and banned the use of Spanish bases for strikes on Iran — for which Trump threatened him with sanctions. The Netanyahu–Trump duo, like in a western film, are already placing “Wanted” posters with rewards for the elimination of Iranian figures marked for decapitation across all Iranian pillars of power. Without an energetic condemnation of these decapitations, similar “Wanted” posters could appear on European pillars targeting critics of American and Israeli “achievements.”

The purpose of now-defunct international law was precisely to prevent hostility toward a regime from becoming justification for illegal war. It was not designed as a system rewarding “good behavior” according to hegemonic criteria, but as a set of constraints for moments like this — when powerful states decide that their target is so objectionable that normal rules no longer apply.

D.J.: How does international law treat Iranian retaliation and what is the role of the Union?

S.V.: Under international law, foreign military bases are considered part of the armed forces of the state that operates them — and as such, legitimate military targets. Attacks are lawful only with a legal basis, such as self-defense (as Iran claims), and subject to proportionality and civilian protection. Iran has largely adhered to these principles.

However, the Iraqi pro-Iranian militia Ashab al-Kahf claimed responsibility for a drone attack on a coalition base (US, France, Italy, and Kurdish forces) in Makhmour near Erbil in the Kurdistan Region. This is infrastructure within Operation Chammal, where Kurdish Peshmerga forces are trained to fight pro-Iranian militias in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran.

These militias are listed as terrorist organizations by Western countries — as is the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), which the United States has also designated as such. The European Union, unlike the US, adopted in 2013 only a non-binding resolution politically criticizing the IRGC and sanctioning individuals.

Why such caution? Declaring the IRGC a terrorist organization would mean the EU, for the first time in its history, would designate the official military structure of a state as such — with a potential domino effect. Tehran had already announced retaliation: labeling European armies as terrorist organizations and cutting relations with the Union. It was known that coalition military infrastructure near Erbil would be among the most exposed, due to its proximity to the Iranian border and its role in training Kurdish opposition groups for infiltration into Iran. Thus, following the Israeli-American aggression, a French soldier was killed at the base last week and six others were wounded.

D.J.: So how does international law treat Iranian retaliation and what is the Union’s role in defending against it?

S.V.: Under international law, foreign military bases are considered part of the armed forces of the state that operates them. In an armed conflict, they are legitimate military targets and may be attacked. However, such an attack can only be lawful if there is a legal basis for the use of force — for example the right of self-defense, as in the Iranian case — and if the rules of international humanitarian law are respected, particularly the principles of civilian protection and proportionality. So far, Iran has largely acted within this framework.

However, the Iraqi pro-Iranian militia Ashab al-Kahf did claim responsibility for a drone attack on a coalition base (US, France, Italy, and local Kurdish forces) in Makhmour near Erbil (Kurdistan Autonomous Region, northern Iraq). There, within Operation Chammal, allies train Kurdish Peshmerga forces to fight pro-Iranian militias in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran.

These militias are on Western lists of terrorist organizations because they use weapons against Western interventionism and interests wherever possible. And not only them. The Americans have also placed the IRGC — Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — on their terrorist list, even though it is an official military structure of the Iranian state. The European Union, by contrast, has only adopted a 2013 resolution — a legally non-binding document — used to politically criticize the IRGC and sanction its members.

Why has the EU been cautious? To avoid precedent and far-reaching consequences. For the first time, an official military structure of a state would be designated as terrorist by the EU. If the EU were to label the IRGC as a terrorist organization, it would mean that part of the Iranian state is being designated as terrorist. Iran could then, as it has previously announced, designate European armies as terrorist organizations and restrict or sever diplomatic relations with the Union. Most importantly, it was known that Western military bases in Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and the Gulf states would in that case come under attack from militias linked to Iran. It was also known that the coalition base near Erbil would be among the most vulnerable, due to its proximity to the Iranian border and its role in operating camps for Kurdish opposition groups against Iran, preparing them for infiltration missions into Iranian territory. It was at this base that a French soldier ultimately lost his life, while six others were wounded.

D.J.: Perspective?

S.V.: The incident shows how the French military presence in the Middle East is increasingly drawing Paris into a broader regional conflict. At the same time, France seeks to avoid open war with Iran and largely limits its action to defending its own bases and protecting maritime routes. In the region, France also maintains a wider military infrastructure: Camp de la Paix base (Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates), Prince Hassan Air Base (northeastern Jordan), and the French Forces in Djibouti logistics hub. All these locations are situated along or near key routes of the so-called Iranian strategic corridor Iran–Iraq–Syria–Lebanon, through which Tehran supplies its regional allies and affiliated armed groups.

When we add the fact that French aircraft intercept Iranian missiles from a military base in Jordan and participate in defensive operations protecting Israel, it could be said in military terms that France — both in Ukraine and in the Middle East — often finds itself in a situation of limited or indirect participation in conflict.

There are also obligations within NATO and the European Union — including defending Greenland under Danish sovereignty as well as a US military base attacked in Cyprus. In addition, bilateral security agreements such as the one with Greece in the event of a Turkish attack further extend its commitments. It is clear that Paris is building a broad network of military partnerships that allows France to maintain a presence from the Persian Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean, supporting its ambition to position itself as a leading military and security actor in Europe.

However, this ambition is not unanimously accepted among European and NATO partners. Trump has implicitly framed participation in US strategy in the Middle East as a test of NATO allies’ loyalty — particularly militarily strong France. The absence of support has been linked to questions about the future of the Alliance itself. In a cascading effect, a lack of European support for French defense actions could likewise be interpreted as a test of EU solidarity and could raise questions about the future of the Union. The formation of strong Western military alliances is underway, and it is provoking the formation of opposing ones. This only confirms that the “structure of World War III” is already at a stage of construction awaiting its operating permit.