1967. godine Charles de Gaulle poziva Brigitte Bardot u Élyséejsku palaču.
Supruga ga upozorava: “Charles, nemojte ni pomisliti.”
Prekasno.

When media channels and maritime straits are drowned out by crossfire of verbal exchanges and artillery fire, such as those seen in recent months between Trump and Iran, and between Trump and Netanyahu, it often signals that, behind the scenes, intensive work is underway on a pragmatic solution to exit a difficult situation into which the actors involved have themselves fallen — and from which each side would gladly emerge as the victor.

In this context, the American and Iranian sides have triumphantly announced a 14-point framework peace agreement, confirmed electronically in the form of a memorandum of understanding, which each side interprets as its own victory.

The opening of the Strait of Hormuz is, in some interpretations, presented as an American victory, although passage through Hormuz was already, even prior to the US-Israeli military operation, largely unobstructed. If and when its formal opening takes place under the sovereignty of Iran and Oman, responsible for security in the strait, the agreement does not provide for a standard transit fee but leaves open the possibility of charging security, navigation, and other maritime service fees related to ensuring free passage — a practice that did not exist prior to the military operation.

Trump claims that the objectives of the military operation have been achieved because the Iranian regime has been “decapitated.” In reality, one faction of the same regime has simply been replaced by another. He also maintains that the nuclear issue will be permanently resolved, although it has functioned more as an instrument of political pressure than as a genuine existential threat, particularly in the context of the earlier fatwa against nuclear weapons issued under Ali Khamenei.

Conversely, the issue is being reopened following the targeted elimination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei, who has been succeeded in that position by his son Mojtaba. It remains uncertain whether he will maintain the same doctrine or reinterpret it under new security circumstances.

The memorandum provides for the unfreezing of $24 billion in Iranian assets held abroad. As for the $300 billion in war reparations, it does not provide for direct compensation. The American side, however, speaks of an international reconstruction and investment fund. It is already being speculated that this financial burden will not be borne entirely by the United States and Israel, but primarily by the wealthy Gulf monarchies, which themselves have suffered the consequences of Iranian retaliation due to the presence of US military bases on their territory.

In this context, Israel — a US ally that participated in coordinated strikes on Iran — is not a signatory to the memorandum, although it provides for the end of all military operations in Lebanon and the integration of the Lebanese front into a broader ceasefire between the United States, Iran, and their allies. Since the document does not clearly and unambiguously provide for an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, continued instability in an already deeply fragile Lebanese state (a failed state) is to be expected.

Netanyahu, meanwhile, has not halted but intensified settlement expansion in the West Bank and claims to “control” about 65% of Gaza. It will be politically difficult for him to withdraw from southern Lebanon, which has been largely devastated, with a clear intention of preventing the return of around 300,000 displaced Lebanese.

Ahead of elections scheduled for October this year, Netanyahu needs a clear political articulation of success — even if territorial — given that the central goal of Israeli military operations, the establishment of regional hegemony through military dominance and the consolidation of the Abraham Accords under American sponsorship, has not yet been achieved.

In the end, Iran has successfully defended itself against the world’s strongest military power and Israel, which in turn has proven vulnerable. Israel and the United States have achieved tactical successes, but Iran has retained the strategic advantage — its negotiators were not called “smart people” by Trump for nothing.

It is true that Netanyahu encouraged Trump to enter into conflict with Iran, not because Trump accepted a subordinate role, but out of political opportunism. Assessing that internal unrest was weakening the Iranian regime, he believed that a military operation could open the way to resolving the Middle Eastern dossier through the Abraham Accords, a “Peace Council,” and the strengthening of American-Israeli dominance in the region.

Trump’s relationship with Netanyahu has never been entirely harmonious. Nevertheless, the influence of pro-Israel lobbying groups in the US Congress remains real and significant, particularly regarding financial aid to Israel, which limits Trump’s room for manoeuvre. In this sense, any serious reduction in US support for Israel would be difficult to achieve, and ahead of congressional elections Trump also needs the backing of those same groups.

In this context, rather than analysing Donald Trump’s idiosyncratic personality, it is more useful to consider the critical geopolitical moment that brought him back to power — a global rebalancing unfavourable to the West. This moment explains his military and political hyperactivity, as well as his rapid and multidirectional action.