The Europeans (the so-called “coalition of the willing”), like Donald Trump, claim to be negotiating peace in Ukraine in order to spare the lives of the local population. In this regard, they propose to Russia, instead of Ukraine’s accession to NATO, NATO’s entry into Ukraine.

At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Vladimir Putin stated: “It is necessary to clarify and develop relations between Russia and NATO before Ukraine joins the Alliance – not the other way around. Otherwise, NATO will become Russia’s enemy.” It therefore appears clear that the objective of the so-called European pacifism, perceived by the opposing side—from a position of strength—as a provocation, does not necessarily lead to the avoidance of unnecessary human losses in Ukraine, where, according to Donald Trump’s warnings, approximately 7,000 combatants die each week.

In this context, it is legitimate to question the ultimate purpose of the concern expressed by Ursula von der Leyen regarding Ukrainian children in Russia. Are Europeans truly seeking to protect “the innocence of children, which transcends geography, power and ideology,” as developed by Melania Trump in her letter to Vladimir Putin? Or are they instead seeking to further provoke the Russian side on whose territory these children are located, thereby undermining their already fragile psychological balance; all in order to propose, for the orphans among them, not adoption within a Russia deemed “heterodox,” but adoption into an “orthodox” West?

For both East and West alike, when the desire for parenthood becomes insatiable, love gives way to selfishness, and the child becomes a commodity. Adoption, which should be an act of love, is then reduced to a form of transaction, a stark reflection of global inequalities. The first question is therefore the following: how do Ukrainian authorities—firmly oriented toward the West since 2015—address the issue of the adoption of Ukrainian children?

Low-cost adoption and surrogacy

Ukraineadopt, on the homepage of its portal, begins by requesting donations, which can even be sent in cryptocurrencies: “Dear visitors, due to the war in Ukraine, we ask for your help for our orphans…” The institution then immediately addresses U.S. citizens with a specific message. It informs them that Ukraine is not—unlike the United States—a signatory to the Hague Convention on Adoption (which protects the interests of the children referred to by Melania), making procedures faster and less costly. Given that the United States requires all prospective adoptive parents to go through Hague-accredited agencies in order to initiate an international adoption process and complete the home study, it is possible to connect them with long-established American agencies partnering with Ukraine.[1]

The next page on Ukraineadopt is simply titled Fees: “Adoption fees in Ukraine are very attractive compared to the rest of the world where adoption is possible. In reality, Ukraine is one of the least expensive countries in which to adopt. We offer a competitive program starting at USD 9,500, depending on the child’s age, health condition, and the region where the child is located.” This is followed by another message aimed at American adoptive parents (clearly the most sought-after clients) — a promotion of Ukraine’s surrogacy market that is striking in its directness: “In reality, U.S. citizens cannot adopt a healthy white child anywhere in the world without waiting at least 5 to 8 years and at very high cost. In Ukraine, there are no healthy children under the age of 5 available, and under current legislation, adoption of children of this age is not permitted. Today, there is no real alternative to surrogacy, given that adoption of European babies is prohibited in all countries, and India banned surrogacy for foreign nationals in 2015. Total surrogacy cost comparison: in the United States USD 110,000–140,000, in Ukraine USD 33,000–42,000.”[2]

Thus, not only has this democratic Ukrainian authority—strongly supported by Europeans—made its orphans “affordable,” it has also “employed” its women in the low-cost surrogacy industry for foreigners. This is echoed in Figaro Vox by Céline Ravel-Dumas, author of a study on surrogacy[3]. Outraged by French media appearances of commissioning parents of Ukrainian babies—concerned solely with whether they would be able to retrieve their surrogacy-born children despite the war in Ukraine—she states: “Surrogacy—especially in Ukraine, and even more so in wartime—does not in any way guarantee the dignity of women who have become slaves to a ruthless industry. The psychological integrity of these ‘surrogate mothers’ cannot be preserved, because their economic situation deprives them of any real freedom of choice. (…) In Ukraine, surrogacy reveals itself in its darkest and rawest form. In the eyes of Westerners who refuse to look beyond their own desire, driven by the profit motive of an industry that stops at nothing for gain. Not a word, not a voice for these women, whose temporary survival is only permitted in order to deliver their ‘package’, before returning to a fate even more tragic than the poverty that led them to carry the child of another—to feed their own.”

Ukrainian demographic catastrophe

Before the war, according to available data held by Anne Genetet, a member of the French Parliament representing French citizens abroad and a medical doctor, the “Ukrainian baby factory” of surrogacy was sending approximately two children per week exclusively to French “commissioning parents.” As a result, the Ukrainian “baby industry,” concerned about a “drop in turnover and competitiveness on the market,” launched a media campaign aimed at reassuring its “clients” and demonstrating its commitment to the safety of the ordered babies, as well as to their “on-time delivery” to commissioning parents. For example, BioTexCom[4], a major Ukrainian surrogacy provider (which does not hesitate to offer Black Friday-style surrogacy promotions[5]), published a video on YouTube showing the “collection” of babies from bunkers in several cities in order to transport them to neighboring countries.

Thus, despite civil and interstate war and a profound internal demographic crisis (with birth rates having fallen by 35% and millions of women and children leaving the country), Ukraine has remained a center of the surrogacy industry in Europe (a model already followed by Georgia and Kazakhstan). Ukrainian surrogate mothers give birth each year to approximately 3,000 healthy children, for which each receives between €15,000 and €20,000, according to estimates by Deutsche Welle. The babies receive Ukrainian birth certificates and passports so that the “commissioning parents” can take them to their countries of origin and regularize their status there, often through adoption procedures.

At the same time, according to UNICEF, around 70% of children in Ukraine—approximately 3.5 million—do not have access to basic necessities such as food and safe housing. Before the war, in 2021, this figure was below 18%. Since February 2022, more than 2,700 children have been killed or injured. One third live without running water or sanitation, and nearly half have no safe space to play. One in five children has lost a parent, relative, or friend.

And it is to this Ukraine—described as managing its human resources in an irrational manner—that Volodymyr Zelensky and his allies are demanding the return of children they claim were “deported or abducted during the war, then transferred to Russia and occupied territories, which could constitute a war crime.” Vladimir Putin, for his part, responds that Russia has “relocated children from conflict zones in order to save their lives and health.” During the Istanbul negotiations in 2025, the Russian side described Ukrainian proposals for the return of children as a “spectacle for European grandmothers without children,” implying that it was a media performance rather than a genuine humanitarian issue. In Istanbul, Ukrainian authorities handed Russia a list of 339 children and requested their unconditional return. According to the official report of the Zelensky-backed organization Bring Kids Back UA, 1,037 children have been returned to Ukraine to date. Russian officials now claim that the issue concerns only a few hundred children, while the Ukrainian side speaks of thousands…

The issue of Ukrainian children in Russia

It is therefore in principle both legitimate and even noble to seek clarification, within the framework of peace negotiations, on the issue of “missing” Ukrainian children. But how should this be approached?

On the one hand, Zelensky accuses the Russian side of systematically re-educating Ukrainian children in order to erase their national identity, which he describes as genocide. On the other hand, although he could have prevented the 2022 Russian intervention by renouncing NATO membership, this idea has not left him. He would readily prefer, instead of Ukraine joining NATO, that NATO officially enter Ukraine. It follows that it is not reasonable to return children to a war-torn environment. Nor is it reasonable to allow the adoption of Ukrainian children while Ukraine has not ratified the 1993 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. Although this convention has been placed on the agenda of the Verkhovna Rada on four occasions, it has still not been adopted.

The main reason for this opposition lies in the prohibition of intermediaries and market logics in adoption procedures. Since the Convention requires that all domestic solutions be exhausted before any recourse to international adoption, its ratification by Ukraine would protect Ukrainian children from a market-based approach to adoption. This is not currently the case, hence the legitimate suspicion that, after possible Russian “re-education,” Ukrainian children could be sent to the West for a new form of “re-education.” In this way, their “innocence”—as suggested by Melania—would not be protected. On the contrary, geography, power, and ideology would take precedence over the child’s fundamental right to innocence.

In other words, the issue of Ukrainian children is only one of the cruel consequences of global geopolitical upheavals—external conflicts that Ukrainian governing structures have recklessly internalized as internal conflicts, tearing the country apart for eleven years. To understand and move beyond the Ukrainian crisis, one would therefore need to return impartially to this recent past that led to the current situation, in which, over the heads of Ukrainians, European leader Emmanuel Macron calls Russian leader Vladimir Putin a “monster,” while former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev responds to the French president by calling him a “brainless Gallic rooster.” All this occurs in a context where Ukrainians and Europeans are unable to oppose Putin without American assistance; and where a U.S. intervention would risk escalating into a Third World War, potentially nuclear, should one of the nuclear powers find itself in a position of defeat. Why is Ukraine so important for both the West and Russia?

Let us remember:

EuroMaidan – the name given by pro-European protesters to their gathering on Kyiv’s Independence Square – began on 29 November 2013 and declared itself a “popular assembly” on 22 December. At that time, between 250,000 and 700,000 people were participating in a country of 45 million inhabitants. The uprising broke out after the Ukrainian government postponed the signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union, scheduled for 29 November in Vilnius, citing the need for “a better assessment of the consequences.” Instead, on 17 December, an agreement was concluded with Russia – financial assistance in exchange for closer ties – but this did not resolve the crisis.

What was this crisis really about? The answer leads not only to Kyiv, but also to Brussels, Berlin, Washington, and Moscow[6].

What did the Maidan protesters demand?

The signing of the EU agreement – a “European choice” which, for them, meant freedom, democracy, and market prosperity – opposed to authoritarianism, corruption, and Russian influence. They demanded an end to mafia-like practices, the fight against poverty, unemployment, and the collapse of public services (notably healthcare), inherited from the post-1991 period. Disillusionment with the former leaders of the “Orange Revolution” gave way to distrust of the ruling Party of Regions. All Ukrainians were united by this accumulation of disappointments. In the streets, instead of orange flags, there were yellow and blue flags, as well as the red and black flags of radical nationalists (UPA/OUN), which quickly displaced the symbols of the few remaining left-wing groups.

Who were the protesters and who were the opposition leaders?

The protesters came mainly from the western and central regions as well as Kyiv, while the east and south remained largely passive. They were mostly young people from the middle class. Most belonged to the generation of the 2004 “Orange Revolution”[7], but without its former leaders: Viktor Yushchenko had fallen to around 2% support in 2010, and Yulia Tymoshenko was in prison. Her party, “Fatherland” (Batkivshchyna), which had become the largest after Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, was led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk. The second major party, “UDAR” (“Punch”), was led by former boxer Vitali Klitschko. Both were pro-Western and neoliberal in orientation, and linked to the European People’s Party. UDAR was supported by Angela Merkel (CDU), and its cadres were trained by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, with hopes that Klitschko would become the future president of Ukraine[8]. At the time, the EU still formally supported Tymoshenko and made the signing of the agreement conditional on her release.

When freedom is called “Svoboda”

The third component of the pro-European front was the All-Ukrainian Union “Freedom” (Svoboda), a far-right party with a social discourse, led by Oleh Tyahnybok. In the 2012 parliamentary elections it won 10% of the vote and had strong influence in western Galicia, particularly in Lviv. Originally, it promoted a “national-socialist” ideology (a mixture of extreme nationalism and authoritarian socialism), used symbolism close to the swastika, and was known for openly antisemitic and Russophobic statements. Over time, in order to gain political legitimacy, it adopted national colors and the trident as its symbol. Despite links with radical parties such as Hungary’s Jobbik and France’s then anti-EU National Front, Svoboda presented itself as pro-European. Its vision of Europe was inspired by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded in 1929, which also glorified the legacy of the SS Galicia Division. On Maidan, its activists toppled Lenin statues and attacked left-wing activists [9].

The complexity of Ukraine

While “Svoboda” remained largely confined to Galicia, the other opposition parties operated mainly in the western and central regions. The East and the South supported the Party of Regions, and in the industrial areas there was also a small Communist Party, which called for a referendum on closer ties with Russia. EuroMaidan exposed deep divisions within Ukrainian society: from the East and South, the orientation leaned toward Russia, while from the West it shifted toward the EU. Rather than creating unity, the political narrative often reinforced the idea of “two Ukraines.”

Supported from abroad, the opposition engaged in a risky strategy aimed at attempting to overthrow the government. Although it gathered hundreds of thousands of people, it failed to overcome internal divisions or challenge the legitimacy of the authorities in power. The call for a general strike failed, and on the eve of Christmas 2013, the protests had not spread beyond Maidan. But the war of nerves was only just beginning.

Here is your translation:

Europe – Ukraine: what was this agreement about?

As in 2004, Maidan in 2013 once again mobilised the West and the media. Diplomats, political leaders, and ministers from the EU and the United States came to give speeches on stage in Kyiv. This represented a challenge for the Ukrainian authorities, who kept their composure, but also for the Kremlin, which remained in an observational posture. Kyiv denounced foreign interference, while the United States threatened sanctions in the event of violent repression of the protesters.

Regarding the agreement whose signing had been suspended, little was said about its actual content. It was neither EU membership nor visa-free travel, but a partial opening of markets through a free trade agreement. Ukrainians could expect an influx of Western goods, but also the obligation to adopt strict European standards. Optimists saw it as a chance for modernisation, while sceptics warned of risks for domestic industry and a possible “Greek scenario.”

Yanukovych found himself under pressure: on one side, Brussels made the signing of the agreement conditional on the release of Yulia Tymoshenko, although the European Union had been informed of her judicial case[10]; on the other, Moscow threatened trade sanctions. He oscillated between the European dream and Russian dependency. Into this vacuum, Putin offered a financial lifeline.

Russia – Ukraine: what was the alternative?

Moscow was offering a three-part aid package: a one-third reduction in the price of gas, a $15 billion loan in the form of eurobonds, and a relaunch of industrial cooperation – particularly in aerospace and the military industry – building on the shared Soviet legacy. But what represented the greatest threat to Brussels, Washington, and Maidan was the Customs Union (created in 2007 with Belarus and Kazakhstan), which was expanding toward Armenia and potentially Ukraine. This economic alliance, the implicit foundation of the project for a “Eurasian Union” (a competing bloc to the West integrating former Soviet states), constituted a key element of Putin’s vision of a so-called multipolar world – an alternative to the American unipolar order.

Geopolitical and demographic challenges of post-Maidan Ukraine

From the early 2010s, the Demographic Institute of Kyiv warned of a deep crisis: over twenty years, Ukraine had lost 6.5 million inhabitants due to low birth rates, high mortality, and massive emigration. The population’s health condition was alarming, with projections indicating that “out of one thousand people aged twenty, 30% would not reach the age of sixty”[11].

It was in this context of profound social crisis that the main geopolitical actors in the “battle for Ukraine” – Russia, the European Union, and the United States – prepared for the next decisive moment: the 2014 presidential elections in Ukraine and Belarus. The West and its “democratic allies” in Slavic countries hoped to overthrow Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine and Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus.

2015 — a turning point?

An intense battle for Ukraine began, fought by all means, which, 11 years later, U.S. President Trump is finally trying to contain. Why is Ukraine so important? It is a country that the West perceives as a vast strategic corridor linking the heart of Europe to the heart of Russia (the other corridor being the Balkans, where similar struggles are currently taking place).

Control of this corridor allows control over oil and gas pipelines, enables the modernization and exploitation of industrial facilities rich in raw materials located in the same area (metallurgy, aerospace, nuclear energy), as well as the use of vast areas of fertile land and the opening of a new market for agricultural products and tourism. More importantly, for Western strategists, control of Ukraine has always also meant control over Eurasia – in other words, it is the key to limiting Russian influence.

A symbolic example of this approach to Ukraine was, for instance, the EU’s demand to adapt railway track width if Ukraine wanted to join the Union, which Brussels reportedly accepted as a geopolitical signal of Ukraine’s alignment with the West.

After the “popular revolution” – as the West called EuroMaidan – or the coup d’état – as the Russians call it – Yanukovych left the presidency without formally resigning (which is why the Russians speak of a coup). After Yanukovych’s flight, Russia’s annexation of Crimea followed, war broke out in Donbas – with Russian support for pro-Russian separatists – and, in the early elections, the pro-Western oligarch Petro Poroshenko won.

Accused of protecting corrupt elites instead of implementing promised anti-corruption reforms, the “Chocolate King” was replaced in the following elections by Volodymyr Zelensky, an actor by profession, who promised the same as his predecessors. But he too had little success in controlling the corruption octopus. He was more successful in diverting attention toward patriotism, with the aim of restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity (Crimea and Donbas) and advancing the Euro-Atlantic integrations that could help achieve it.

In the same way that Zelensky slipped into the role of president in a popular TV series before becoming an actual president, he has today so fully slipped into the role of the Ukrainian nationalist that he finally resembles those who genuinely are one. Although he is a man who only began learning Ukrainian after announcing his presidential candidacy, and not without difficulty. He even invented an unconventional method: at the gym, he played the game “language and muscles.” A very simple method. As he explained: “I hang on a bar, Yura gives me a word, I translate it, and if I make a mistake – I do two pull-ups”[12].

After such training, despite having no military service, Zelensky suddenly took on the role of a wartime leader who – according to the original script – was supposed to become a war hero. Of all the roles he had played so far, this one suited him best, so much so that he no longer accepts the new script offered by the same writers – that of a wartime leader who has neither succeeded in regaining lost territories nor in achieving Euro-Atlantic integration.

He does not accept the role of president of a state in which youth die on the battlefield, where oligarchs sunbathe on the Côte d’Azur, and where millions of women and children are displaced… he does not accept the role of president of a state where – amid demographic collapse and war – women carry other people’s children in order to feed their own.

The fact remains that, from Charles de Gaulle to the present day, none of the enthusiastic European “scriptwriters” has yet thought of writing a scenario of a united Europe reaching the Urals. Yet only a united Europe with Russia would be a respectable superpower before which both the United States and China would bow.

Bibliography

[1] See: https://ukraineadopt.com
[2] See: https://ukraineadopt.com/home/our-fees.html
[3] REVEL-DUMAS, Céline, GPA – Le grand bluff, paperback, 2021; FigaroVox, 2 March 2022, https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/societe/marche-de-la-gpa-en-ukraine-l-egoiste-inquietude-des-clients-occidentaux-face-a-la-detresse-des-meres-porteuses-20220301
[4] See: https://biotexcom.com/about-the-clinic/
[5] See: https://genethique.org/black-friday-des-promos-aussi-sur-la-gpa/
[6] See: issue 83 of the journal Politique, January 2014; FigaroVox, 2 March 2022, https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/societe/marche-de-la-gpa-en-ukraine-l-egoiste-inquietude-des-clients-occidentaux-face-a-la-detresse-des-meres-porteuses-20220301
[7] CHAUVIER, Jean-Marie, “The Multiple Pieces of the Ukrainian Chessboard,” Le Monde diplomatique, January 2005.
[8] Der Spiegel, “Kampf um die Ukraine,” 9 December 2013.
[9] Novaya Gazeta, Moscow, 10 December 2013.
[10] “Ukraine: Tracing the Assets Embezzled by Yulia Tymoshenko,” Mediapart, 24 November 2013.
[11] LIBANOVA, Ella, UNIAN, 17 December 2013.
[12] RADIO FRANCE INTER, “Zelensky: the Russian-speaking artist turned Ukrainian president,” 13 May 2025, https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceinter/podcasts/capture-d-ecrans/capture-d-ecrans-du-mardi-13-mai-2025-3600790